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The combination of low contribution rates and 
enhanced benefits has been haunting Pennsylvania 
ever since. By early 2010, its $7 billion surplus had 
vanished, replaced by a $10 billion deficit. The state’s 
head actuary is now projecting that to meet future 
obligations, state and district contributions will have 
to increase nearly eight-fold between 2010 and 2014.1 
Pennsylvania’s case, unfortunately, is not unusual. 
After one of the worst decades in stock market 
history, the Great Recession has left nearly every state 
pension plan in a precarious position. Recently, the 
Pew Center on the States reported that 47 states owe 
more in pension obligations for current and future 
teacher retirees than they have on hand. Collectively, 
the gap between what states have and what they will 
need totals almost $500 billion.2 And with Americans 
living longer and teachers more likely to retire at a 
younger age, the challenge of paying for teacher 
retirements will only increase. 
Policymakers are beginning to take note of the fiscal 
problems in teacher retirement systems. States have 
recently taken action by raising retirement ages, 
lowering benefit payments, and reducing cost-of-
living adjustments.3 These are small steps toward 
shoring up the system to help ensure that it remains 
sustainable in the future. 
But the problems with teacher pensions are not 
just financial. And they do not just affect individual 
teachers and retirees. The way these plans are 
structured can negatively influence the teaching 
work force as a whole. At a time when improving the 
quality of classroom instruction is a national priority, 
key structural elements in teacher retirement plans 
impair the ability of schools to recruit, hire, retain, and 
compensate high-quality teachers and principals. 
For example, while the current set-up works well for 
those who qualify for it, it shortchanges teachers 
who leave the profession or switch between state or 
municipal systems. In other words, it creates some 
big winners at the expense of many small losers. 
It also features elements that compel teachers to 
stay on the job, regardless of burnout or a desire to 
pursue a new career, until they reach a certain career 
milestone, after which they retire immediately or else 
begin to lose out financially. None of these elements 
is likely to draw good talent to the field or address the 
human capital problems that America’s public schools 
are facing.
Underfunded and poorly structured teacher retirement 
systems are problems that the country cannot afford 
to ignore. But reforming these systems is complicated 
and difficult. Recent moves by states to quickly raise 
revenue or decrease benefits do not provide the 
long-term fixes needed to fully address fiscal issues 
as well as human capital or teacher quality concerns. 
And there are significant political and legal barriers 
to reforming pension systems, ranging from meeting 
the interests of powerful teachers unions to amending 
state constitutions that prohibit any changes. 
Still, there are steps that can be taken to modernize 
the system. Some address the technical aspects or 
basic structure of plans; others tackle the political 
obstacles or legal limitations. Some are short 
term; others are more permanent. They all must be 
crafted with an eye toward simultaneously creating a 
sustainable cost structure and improving the quality of 
the teaching work force. 
in 2002, Pennsylvania legislators thought the state’s pension plan 
was sitting pretty. feeling flush from the stock market boom of the 
1990s, actuaries told the Legislature the fund had $7 billion more 
than it would need to cover financial obligations to current and future 
teacher retirees. in response, the Legislature contributed only a tiny 
fraction of what it had been giving, while simultaneously increasing 
teacher retirement benefits.  
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Comparing Pension Plans
Teachers and other public-sector employees typically 
have access to a retirement system or pension 
called a defined benefit plan. Like its name suggests, 
the employer in a DB plan defines the benefit or 
promised amount of money the employee will receive 
in retirement. The employer and employee agree on 
the employee’s contributions, and then the employer 
determines its investments and annual contribution 
rate in order to pay the benefits down the road. 
An important feature of DB plans is the formula used 
to determine how much retirees will receive. The 
formula consists of some factor commonly known 
as a “multiplier” (a percentage of the employee’s 
salary, usually around 2 percent) multiplied by salary 
and years of service. So a DB plan with a multiplier 
of 2 percent would pay an employee with a salary of 
$50,000 and 25 years of service $25,000 a year in 
retirement. (See Figure 1.) Also, in order to ensure that 
teacher pensions are not worn away by inflation over 
the course of retirement, most DB plans include in 
their calculations an annual cost-of-living adjustment. 
Some plans set a fixed rate (2 or 3 percent) for cost 
of living, but others adjust their calculations annually 
to inflation. Because of compounding interest, one 
year’s cost-of-living adjustments affect the next year’s 
benefits, and so on. 
Private-sector workers are more often enrolled in 
what’s called a defined contribution plan. In DC 
plans, the employer communicates in advance 
what percentage of an employee’s salary they will 
contribute to his or her retirement account. Employees 
own the accounts and are responsible for deciding 
their own contributions and investments. 
Public- and private-sector workers’ retirements used 
to be structured more similarly, with both groups 
more likely to have access to DB plans. But that has 
changed over the last 25 years as private-sector 
employers have abandoned DB plans. In 1985, four-
fifths of private-sector workers had access to a DB 
plan; by 2009, the number was closer to one in five.4 
In contrast, 89 percent of teachers and 84 percent 
of all state and local government employees are still 
enrolled in a DB plan.5 
In a typical DC plan, employers open 401(k) accounts 
for their workers and sometimes match a portion of 
the employee’s contributions. Unlike DB plans, where 
the employer promises some future benefit level at 
some future point in time, employers must contribute 
to DC plans with real-time cash contributions. Both 
employee and employer contributions to the accounts 
are pre-tax, meaning they are not subject to federal 
income tax prior to being deposited. The idea is 
that through contributions and the growth of the 
investment itself, the account will grow substantially 
over time. With a few exceptions, workers are unable 
to access the money before they turn 59½ without 
incurring tax liability and penalties. At age 70½ or after 
retirement, whichever comes later, retirees must make 
certain minimum distributions, but money remaining in 
the account after their death can pass to their heirs.
Unlike DB plans, DC plans are in workers’ names and 
are portable, meaning employees can take them when 
they leave. Along with this flexibility, however, comes 
considerable risk. It is the worker, for instance, who 
bears the burden of poor investment choices, such as 
a lack of diversification, meager or negative returns in 
a down stock market, and insufficient contributions if 
they elect not to save enough.
DB plans, in contrast, offer much greater predictability 
for their members. In this case, the institutions 
responsible for operating the plans, typically state or 
local governments, carry all the risk. They calculate 
how much money they’ll need to contribute to cover 
current and future retirees. They employ specialists 
with the sole job of picking investments that will return 
a profit over the long run. In other words, DB plans 
take care of many of the decisions that DC plans hand 
over to individual employees, who may not be experts 
at predicting their own budgetary needs or at picking 
a mix of investments that will help them reach their 
retirement goals. 
Multiplier × × =Salary Years ofservice Benefit
Figure 1. How Defined Benefit Pension Payments 
Are Calculated
(2 percent) ($50,000) (25) ($25,000)
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When the funding ratio falls 
below 100 percent, it is 
said to be “underfunded,” 
because it owes more than it 
has. Currently, 47 states are 
underfunded by almost  
$452 billion.
The Problem With 
Underfunding
Just as an individual can fail to save enough, make a 
bad investment decision, or overestimate the rate of 
return they will see from investments, state and local 
governments can do the same thing. This is why many 
are scrambling to find ways to raise revenue to cover 
the shortfalls they face.
Annual employer and employee contributions help 
fill public pension plan coffers, but as plans become 
larger over time, they rely more heavily on investment 
returns. (See Figure 2.) Investment returns made up 
about two-thirds of the change in public pension plan 
assets over the 15-year period ending in 2008.6 Thus, 
predictions and assumptions about future investment 
returns have become all the more important. An 
investor assuming a large return, for example, can 
contribute less every year than one who assumes 
lower returns. (See sidebar “Tricky Assumptions” on 
page 5.)
Also, as funds rely more on investment returns over 
time, their total asset values become more susceptible 
to market fluctuations. When the market rises, 
pension plan coffers are flush, and actuaries calculate 
lower contribution rates, or what employers would 
need to make in order to meet future obligations. 
When the market falls, those same actuaries ask for 
higher contribution rates. The goal is a 100 percent 
“funding ratio,” which means the fund’s total asset 
value is exactly enough to cover all future payments. 
When the funding ratio falls below 100 percent, it is 
said to be “underfunded,” because it owes more than 
it has. Currently, 47 states are underfunded by almost 
$452 billion.7
To alleviate the underfunding problem and to calculate 
what they owe more accurately—as opposed to 
chasing the most recent results—pension funds use 
a process called “smoothing.” Here, they use rolling 
averages of multiple years of returns so that any 
temporary gains or losses in investment income do 
not compel the state to swing contributions too far in 
one direction. This helps maintain focus on the long-
term funding ratio, but it does not entirely prevent the 
state from feeling especially prosperous near the end 
of long bull markets, such as the technology boom 
in the late 1990s and the housing-driven bubble from 
2002–07, or particularly poor after precipitous drops, 
such as the 2008–09 recession.
Take Pennsylvania, for example. Feeling flush with 
money in 2002, the Public School Employees’ 
Retirement System of Pennsylvania set employer 
contributions at unsustainably low rates at the 
same time they increased benefits by increasing 
the multiplier factor and cost-of-living-adjustments. 
Then the market dropped, and in 2009 Pennsylvania 
announced it will be increasing the employer 
contribution rate for retired teacher pension and health 
benefits in 2010–11 by 72 percent. The projections 
into the future are even worse; PSERS is currently 
predicting the rate to nearly triple by 2012–13.
Earnings on
investments
Government
contributions
Employee
contributions
Figure 2. Investment Returns Matter More 
Over Time
Source: Authors’ calculations from http://www.census.gov/govs/www/retire.
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The fluctuation in employee contribution rates, 
however, is not altogether atypical. Figure 3 shows a 
60-year look, 30 years back and a 30-year projection 
forward, at employee and employer contributions into 
PSERS. The gray line is the percentage of salary that 
the average employee contributes, and it has risen 
just slightly over time. The blue line is the combined 
contribution of school districts and the state 
(determined by formula, but the state contributes 
a little more than half), and it has fluctuated wildly. 
It was in double digits from 1973 to 1997, hit a low 
of 1.09 in 2002, and is expected to reside above 30 
percent from 2014 to 2020.
The projections include an 8 percent annual 
investment gain for the next 30 years, but even after 
that assumption is added to the large employer 
contributions, in 2039 the state will still be only 97 
percent funded. 
The financial problems would be daunting alone 
if they weren’t compounded by demographic 
trends. The baby boom generation has been well 
documented, and their impending retirements 
should not be a surprise to anyone. But the fact that 
plans are underfunded at the precise time that baby 
boomers are nearing retirement is a real problem, 
especially considering Americans are living longer.8 
The life expectancy for 65-year-old males and females 
in 1979 was 14.2 and 18.4 years, respectively. Those 
are now up to 17 and 19.7.9 
Teachers have even more years in retirement than the 
typical American, since they retire about four years 
younger than the national average.10 Workers make 
retirement decisions for many reasons, including the 
amount and the structure of their retirement benefits. 
Research has found that DB plans, through the 
assurance provided by guaranteed monthly payments 
until death, lower the age at which employees are 
likely to retire by one to two years.11 In other words, 
based on plan structure alone, public-sector workers 
are more likely to retire at much younger ages than 
private-sector employees. 
Because DB plans build up a reserve for future benefit 
payments, these trends would be fully accounted 
for if the plans were fully funded. But since the plans 
have not been properly funded over the years, the 
challenge of paying for the baby boom crunch will fall 
on future generations. 
The Benefits of Defined 
Benefits
Despite the fiscal woes, the current defined benefit 
systems do work. They force individuals and their 
employers to save for retirement at levels much 
higher than the average private-sector worker. 
And state pension plans have many advantages 
over individual investors: They employ full-time 
investment professionals to manage the accounts; 
they can invest in market sectors that individuals 
typically do not have access to; and, perhaps most 
importantly, the state plans do not have to adjust 
their investments according to life cycles. (Individual 
investors are encouraged to invest aggressively when 
they’re young because they’re able to weather market 
fluctuations, but they must adjust their holdings into 
more conservative, lower-earning investments as 
they approach retirement. Large DB plans managed 
by states or localities do not have to make this 
adjustment and are free to maximize their returns at all 
times.) 
For all of these reasons, state pension funds earn 
returns that are about 1 percent higher than what 
the typical individual investor could expect.12 The 
overall result is a good one: Millions of retired public 
teachers and other public servants gain a steady 
stream of income, adjusted for inflation as they 
age, that’s guaranteed to last their entire lifetime. 
Employer
contribution
Average employee
contribution
Figure 3. Pennsylvania’s Employer Contributions
Fluctuate Wildly
Source: http://www.psers.state.pa.us/press/pension_funding_issues/index.html. 
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Tricky Assumptions 
How to value a pension plan’s assets against its liabilities 
has garnered much debate over the last 40 years. And the 
issue is an important one—figuring out how much you will 
owe tomorrow will change how much you save today. The 
arguments are primarily centered on the investment return 
rate, sometimes called the “discount rate,” that states 
should assume for their investments and inflation. If they 
select a higher rate (i.e., assume their investments will 
grow more quickly), they are able to contribute less today 
than if they assumed they would grow more slowly. 
Most states assume they’ll be able to earn about 8 
percent, before inflation, on their investments. Historically, 
this is a conservative estimate. The National Association 
of State Retirement Administrators found that state plans 
average a 9.3 percent return for the 25-year period ending 
December 31, 2009.1 The median state plan was just 
under this mark, at 9.25 percent. This period includes 
both bull and bear markets, including the Great Recession 
of 2007-09. While the past doesn’t predict the future, it 
shouldn’t be ignored either. 
Yet, some actuarial analysts, using shorter timeframes 
to show the volatility involved with these assumptions, 
argue states should be even more conservative.2 Primarily, 
they point out that teacher retirement liabilities are “risk-
free,” that is, the state has little choice but to make the 
payments. And, if the liabilities are risk-free, this group 
argues that investments should be risk-free as well. The 
Government Accounting Standards Board, or GASB, the 
federal agency responsible for determining rules under 
which state and local governments have to make their 
actuarial calculations, appears poised to adopt some 
middle ground between leaving states to do what they’re 
currently doing and requiring them to assume risk-free 
investment return rates.3
GASB has traditionally allowed states to take a long-term 
view, because a state, unlike a private corporation, is not 
at risk of going out of business. Consider the state of 
Illinois, which had the lowest funding ratio of any state 
pension fund on July, 1, 2008, at 54 percent. This means 
that if Illinois goes bankrupt, it would only be able to meet 
54 percent of its current and future pension obligations. 
But, unlike private corporations, state governments are 
able to avoid bankruptcy by increasing taxes, raising 
contribution rates from participating districts, or issuing 
bonds. Such options clearly distinguish Illinois from Enron, 
Trans World Airlines and Bethlehem Steel, all high-profile 
examples of private corporations that went under and 
took their DB pension plans, and the employees covered 
under them, down with them. It’s safe to say the state of 
Illinois will exist, in more or less its current form, for the 
foreseeable future. Thus, while it’s a problem in either 
venue, unfunded liability in the public and private sector 
should be looked at differently. 
1. Keith Brainard, “Public Pension Plan Investment Return 
Assumptions,” (Washington, DC: National Association of State 
Retirement Administrators, March 2010). 
2.  See, for example, Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh, 
“Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What 
are They Worth?” December 18, 2009, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352608, or Joshua D. Rauh, “Are 
State Public Pensions Sustainable?” (paper presented at the 
conference Train Wreck: A Conference on America’s Looming 
Fiscal Crisis, Los Angeles, CA, January 2010). 
3.  Preliminary Views of the Government Accounting Standards 
Board: Plain-Language Supplement, (Washington, DC: 
Government Accounting Standards Board of the Financial 
Accounting Foundation, June 2010). 
As policymakers look to reform pension plans, the 
elements that contribute to this stability should be 
preserved. 
Also, while it’s true that almost every state is facing a 
shortfall, it’s important to take a more in-depth look 
at the underfunding issue. Looking at the gap alone 
ignores what states have already put away. The same 
report calculating the $452 billion deficit also showed 
that states had put away more than $2.3 trillion in their 
plans. And even though those funds would need to 
cover $2.8 trillion in long-term liabilities, if we consider 
what states have put away the $452 billion deficit 
figure appears more manageable. 
A historical context is also useful. While the current 
funding ratios are less than ideal, they are not 
catastrophic. The most recent figures from the Public 
Fund Survey, a compilation of 101 state and municipal 
retirement plans, show that the aggregate funding 
ratio for these plans reached a high of 102 in 2001 
at the end of the Internet-led bull market. Through a 
combination of poor investment returns and benefit 
enhancements, the ratio had fallen to 85 by July 
2008, about where it was in 1994.13 The stock market 
boom of the late 1990s allowed pension funds to 
avoid making hard choices. But it would be unwise to 
assume that will happen again. 
The national funding level totals, and even the state-
level numbers, are often less helpful to consider than 
the figures on a per capita basis, because any deficit 
must be overcome by the state’s taxpayers, and any 
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surplus is owed to them. Nationally the per capita 
unfunded liability amounts to almost $1,500 for every 
man, woman, and child, but funding levels vary quite 
dramatically across state boundaries. (See Figure 4.) 
Three states—Washington, Florida, and New York—
actually had surpluses, meaning they had more than 
enough saved to cover the accrued pension benefits 
of all current workers and retirees. The largest liability 
in total dollars is California at nearly $60 billion, but 
on a per resident basis it falls to 26th. Alaska ranks 
worst in this category, as each person living in the 
state owes more than $5,100 to current and future 
government worker retirees, compared to New York 
with a $500 surplus per person. 
Social Security offers additional context on the 
funding ratio figures because it too goes through 
periods of over- and underfunding. Unlike state 
and local pension plans, Social Security collects 
the tax dollars of current workers, pays money out 
immediately as benefits for current retirees, and 
invests the surplus in Treasury bills. Tax rates are set 
by Congress to more or less meet the equilibrium, 
but, because rates are not adjusted annually, there are 
times of surplus and times of need. As of 2009, the 
Social Security trust fund had a surplus of $2.2 trillion, 
but without policy changes, that figure is expected 
to begin falling in 2016 and be completely exhausted 
by 2039.14 This pay-as-you-go model was used by 
state and local pension plans until most transitioned 
in the 1970s and ‘80s to the current model of 
keeping a reserve fund to meet future obligations. 
Massachusetts, for example, operated on a pay-as-
States running 
a surplus (per capita)
New York $535
Florida $98
Washington $27
Biggest unfunded 
liability per capita
Alaska $5,133
Connecticut $4,529
Illinois $4,215
Biggest total 
unfunded liability
California $59.5 billion
Illinois $54.4 billion
New Jersey $34.4 billion
Figure 4. Forty-Seven States Have Unfunded Liabilities
Note: Authors’ calculations from “The Trillion Dollar Gap,” (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center on the States, February 2010). 
Unfunded liability 
(per capita)
Over $3,000
$1,501–$3,000
$501–$1,500
Up to $500
Surplus
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you-go basis until 1990 and has gradually increased 
its reserve fund holdings and improved its funding 
ratio over time.15 
In fact, some degree of government pension plan 
underfunding may be acceptable. The GAO, for 
instance, in its semi-regular reports tracking state and 
local government pensions, measures the percentage 
of plans with a funding ratio of 80 percent or better. 
Moreover, an overfunded system would suggest the 
state had invested more money for future retirees than 
was actually needed. The surplus could have instead 
been spent on any other pressing budget area. 
Pensions and the Teaching 
Work Force
For all their strengths, public-sector defined benefit 
retirement plans have a number of structural elements 
that negatively affect the teaching work force. Public 
pension benefits have been structured and enhanced 
over the last two decades to heavily favor teachers 
willing to stay in the profession for their entire career 
or those who are committed to staying in one state or 
district. 
These incentive structures no longer match the 
profile of the teaching work force. In 1987–88, the 
median teacher had 14 years of experience, and the 
mode of teacher experience, or the most common 
occurrence, was a teacher with 15 years on the job. 
By 2007–08, the median had dropped to 11, and the 
mode had plunged to one.16 (See Figure 5.) In other 
words, a teacher with only one year of experience is 
now more common than any other teacher/experience 
combination. 
Defined benefit pension plans have always used 
years of experience as one component of the 
benefit formula. This makes sense: It’s easy to 
measure, and it encourages a stable work force. A 
stable and experienced teaching force is also cost 
effective, since recruitment and training costs can be 
substantial. 
But an additional year of teaching experience does 
not necessarily mean a teacher is more effective. 
Teaching effectiveness tends to increase rapidly in 
a teacher’s first few years on the job, only to level 
off after a few years.17 In other words, the first years 
of experience are far more valuable than later ones, 
and teachers with a few years of experience are 
indistinguishable, in terms of effectiveness in the 
classroom, from teachers with many more years on 
the job.
Teacher pension plans, however, are structured as if 
those last years are the most productive. Plans mostly 
back-load benefits so that teachers accrue substantial 
pension wealth in their last years in the classroom. 
Factoring in annual salary and benefits, teachers earn 
their peak compensation about age 55, much later 
than their private-sector peers. Lawyers and doctors, 
for instance, reach their compensation peaks much 
earlier, in their early 40s. But for them, it’s more like 
reaching a plateau, as their compensation stays more 
or less constant for the next 20 years.18 For teachers, 
their peak compensation is truly a peak, meaning they 
reach their maximum wages in their last years on the 
job as salary and benefits spike at the end of their 
career. Their most lucrative days are near their last. 
Consider the pension wealth accrual of a teacher in 
the state of Missouri who begins teaching at age 25, 
but doesn’t reach her peak compensation until age 
53. (See Figure 6.) She is “vested” after five years 
of teaching, when she is 30, meaning she would 
be eligible to receive a retirement benefit at age 60. 
Benefits accrue linearly until she has put in 20 years, 
2007–08
1987–88
Figure 5. Teachers Today Have Fewer Years 
of Experience 
Source: Thomas G. Carroll and Elizabeth Foster, “Who Will Teach? Experience Matters,” 
(Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, January 2010). 
200
150
100
50
0
Number of teachers (thousands)
1 40Years of experience
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at which time they start to increase much more 
rapidly. In Missouri, benefits peak when teachers hit 
the “rule of 80,” a common rule allowing employees 
to retire with full benefits when their experience and 
age sum to 80 years. This teacher passes this mark 
at age 53, when she has 28 years of experience 
(53 years old + 28 years of experience = 81 years). 
Pension wealth accruals fall steeply after that, other 
than a small bounce for a delayed retirement program. 
And for every year she works after age 56, pension 
wealth accruals are actually negative. Since she could 
retire with full employment benefits at this point, she 
would essentially be losing pension wealth for every 
year she continues to work. (This does not count 
“double-dipping,” whereby a retiree can start working 
again, in basically the same job, while also collecting 
a pension.) 
The pension accruals in Figure 6 represent significant 
sums of money. For a teacher with a $50,000 annual 
salary, her pension wealth increases by nearly 
$100,000 at her peak. Missouri’s case is not atypical. 
Similar charts have been created for many other 
states.19
The large financial incentives in current retirement 
plans have negative implications for teachers and 
their students. If burned-out teachers are willing to 
hang on just to earn a larger retirement package, they 
are doing a disservice to the children they teach. Or, 
if teachers are still passionate and effective past the 
point of the normal retirement age, they face large 
monetary penalties to stay in the classroom. 
These extreme rewards and penalties do affect 
retirement behavior. When a new benefit enhancement 
for California teachers created a financial windfall 
for teachers with 30 years of experience who were 
exactly 61 ½ years old, the percentage of teachers 
retiring at the relatively odd age of 61 ½ doubled. 
Another component, allowing the multiplier factor 
to increase for teachers with 30 years or more of 
experience, meant that teachers suddenly became 
three times more likely to retire with 30.5 years 
of experience than with 29.5.20 Not surprisingly, 
when looking at the percentage of teachers retiring 
according to the sum of their years of experience and 
age in Missouri, there’s a steep spike around the “rule 
of 80.” (See Figure 7.) Teachers appear to know their 
benefits and plan their retirement accordingly. 
Excessive rewards for longevity might be justifiable 
if they applied to all teachers equally. Unfortunately, 
current public-sector defined benefit pension systems 
are heavily biased toward teachers with longevity 
and stability. Many state systems essentially punish 
Benefits kick
in at age 30
And hit their
maximum at 
age 53
Then decline
at age 57
Figure 6. Incentives in Missouri Teachers’
Pension Accruals
Source: Robert M. Costrell and Michael Podgursky, “Peaks, Cliffs and Valleys: The Peculiar 
Incentives in Teacher Retirement Systems and their Consequences for School Staffing,” 
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, November 2007). 
Note: Assumes Jefferson City, MO, teacher salary schedule.
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Source: Michael Podgursky and Mark Ehlert, “Teacher Pensions and Retirement Behavior,” 
(Washington, D.C.: National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research, 
April 2007). 
Note: Excludes St. Louis and Kansas City teachers.
The “rule of 80”: 
age + experience 
equals 80–85
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As education leaders and 
policymakers struggle to identify 
highly effective teachers, 
increase their numbers, and 
distribute them equitably, 
outdated pension structures 
often stand in the way.
teachers who enter or exit the system prematurely. 
Such plans allow workers to cash out with a lump-
sum payment if they exit before retirement age, 
but most often workers have to do so without their 
employer’s contributions. More importantly, if workers 
opt not to take the lump-sum, the pension that arrives 
years later when they retire will be calculated based 
on their final average salary from many years before, 
unadjusted for inflation or salary increases. And, 
at the other end, plans allow entering workers to 
purchase years of experience credit, but they impose 
strict limits and require entering workers to cover the 
employer’s share as well. 
These mobility penalties can amount to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in lost pension wealth. Using 
the benefit formula and base salary information from 
Missouri, researchers found that a teacher staying in 
one place for 30 years would accumulate twice the 
pension wealth than a peer teaching in two districts 
for 15 years each.21 
Thus, depending on how salary schedules and 
retirement benefits are designed, they can either 
help or hinder efforts to recruit and retain effective 
teachers, a goal that has moved to the center of 
the policymaking and grant-making agendas today. 
Research clearly indicates that among in-school 
factors, teacher quality matters more to student 
learning than anything else schools contribute. In fact, 
research by economists Eric Hanushek and William 
Sanders suggests that the differences in effectiveness 
between highly effective and highly ineffective 
teachers are large enough over multiple years to 
substantially offset or possibly even overcome the 
racial and economic gaps in student achievement that 
exist today.22 
As education leaders and policymakers struggle 
to identify highly effective teachers, increase their 
numbers, and distribute them equitably, outdated 
pension structures often stand in the way. In an 
Education Sector survey, nearly four out of five 
teachers agreed that, “too many veteran teachers 
who are burned out stay because they do not want 
to walk away from the benefits and service time they 
have accrued.” About the same number indicated 
that making it easier to leave and return to teaching 
without losing retirement benefits would help attract 
and retain high-quality teachers to the teaching 
profession.23
Although the demands on schools and the ways 
schools operate have changed dramatically over the 
past 40 years, public education’s approach to human 
capital has changed little. Teachers are still mostly 
attracted, trained, evaluated, and compensated 
much as they were generations ago. As such, these 
processes are generally misaligned with today’s 
efforts to improve the quality of classroom instruction. 
This is an enormous problem considering that 
70 percent of the $582 billion spent annually on 
American public education goes directly to supporting 
personnel.24 No enterprise, public or private, can 
thrive over time without paying close attention to how 
it recruits, trains, and retains its very best people.
Pension reform cannot be expected to entirely solve 
our human capital problems. But given the link 
between compensation and human capital challenges, 
as well as the clear disincentives that exist today, it is 
essential that conversations on pension reform and 
improving teacher quality do not happen apart from 
each other.    
The Fix 
There are no simple tweaks to address public-sector 
pension plan underfunding, longevity, or mobility 
problems. Powerful political interests helped put 
existing public-sector DB plan elements in place over 
time, and equally powerful legal protections ensure 
their continuity. These make any changes to pension 
plans all the more difficult, but there are promising 
legal, political, technical, and structural strategies 
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states can pursue to better meet the needs of a 
modern teaching work force. 
Managing Political Influences
Teachers, with 3.3 million active workers, or more than 
one out of every 50 working Americans, constitute 
the largest professional occupation in the country. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that teachers 
unions are one of the most powerful interest groups. 
The National Education Association, the nation’s 
largest teachers union, was the single biggest donor 
to national and state political campaigns in 2008, and 
most of that money was directed to state candidates. 
More than 95 percent, $53.6 million out of $56.2 
million, went to influence state campaigns.25 As a 
result, teachers unions exert a strong influence over 
governors and legislators making pension decisions. 
With such strong political advantages to gain, 
legislators often move to raise retirement benefits, 
particularly during years of financial boom. In so 
doing, they can point to something concrete that they 
have done for an influential constituency. Nationally, 
researchers have found that state legislatures made 
retirement plans about 10 percent more generous 
between 1982 and 2006.26
Yet, because the costs of raising benefits are deferred 
until the teachers actually retire, the total bill won’t 
come due for years. The legislators who vote for 
increasing retirement benefits are not the ones 
who have to figure out how to pay for them. This 
political disconnect leads to circumstances like one 
experienced in Missouri in the 1990s. From 1992 to 
2002, the Legislature voted eight times to increase 
teacher retirement benefits, moves that collectively 
will cost the state $193,000, in present dollars, for 
each teacher.27 
Some states, in an attempt to bind future legislators 
to meet previously determined contribution levels, 
have passed laws attempting to hold legislators 
accountable by requiring full contributions each year. 
Not surprisingly, these measures have not worked, 
because current legislators can always pass new laws 
to ignore the wishes of prior legislatures.  
Georgia and Oklahoma, however, have found a way to 
combat the political urge to increase pension benefits 
during boom years, and other states could follow 
their lead. These two states passed constitutional 
amendments requiring a lag time between a proposal 
to increase benefits and the vote on the proposal. 
Any law changing the benefit calculation must be 
proposed in one year, accompanied by a full report on 
the budgetary consequences of the decision, paired 
with full funding to pay for the changes, and cannot 
be voted on until the following year. This guarantees 
ample time for public discussion and a full accounting 
of the legislature’s decisions. The constitutional nature 
of these provisions may be necessary to bind future 
legislatures. 
Compared to annual salaries, pensions are a 
relatively small pot of money—teachers receive 
about 14 percent, on average, of their annual salary 
as employer paid contributions to their defined 
benefit retirement accounts—but their political 
value is substantial.28 As such, pension reforms are 
either neglected in favor of other efforts or used as 
bargaining tools to attain larger policy goals. Denver 
leaders were able to put in place the controversial 
(at the time)  ProComp merit pay program, which 
rewards teachers with up to $2,403 a year for student 
achievement gains, but they left in place large back-
end retirement benefits potentially worth hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to teachers.29 Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg in New York City has traded increases in 
the city’s teacher retirement plan contribution for a 
small merit pay program and for eliminating two days 
of teacher planning before school started in the fall.30 
Trades like these ignore the importance of pension 
reform. 
With such strong political 
advantages to gain, legislators 
often move to raise retirement 
benefits, particularly during 
years of financial boom. In 
so doing, they can point to 
something concrete that they 
have done for an influential 
constituency.
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Overcoming Legal Barriers
Many states have created powerful legal boundaries 
to protect workers from employers making arbitrary 
changes to pension plans. These protections, 
while important, are exceedingly rare in all other 
professions, and they serve as boundaries that will 
guide any prospective changes to state or municipal 
pension plans. States protect pensions in different 
ways, each of which has a distinct set of options for 
pension reform.31 Some of these barriers are quite 
onerous, limiting changes only to future employees, 
while others provide more flexibility. 
New York and Illinois, for example, prohibit any 
reduction in benefits for current employees, even 
those benefits that are merely potential. Adopting a 
new benefit calculation would be impermissible if it 
resulted in a single participant receiving one single 
dollar less than they would have received under the 
old formula, even if the benefits have yet to be earned. 
These restrictions can be removed only through 
changes to the state’s constitution. 
Many states view public-sector retirement benefit 
formulas as a contract between an employer and an 
employee, but this still varies from state to state. A 
number of states use what’s called the “California 
rule,” whereby a contract is deemed to exist as of 
the date an employee is hired, and states can make 
changes to the contract only if any disadvantages 
caused by such changes are offset by comparable 
new advantages. Other states view public pension 
plans as contracts (often formed on the first day 
of employment, but this varies among states), but 
allow changes that are reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose. Judges in these 
Type of Fix Potential Fix Strength(s) Weakness(es)
Technical Raise Retirement Age •	Politically symbolic 
•	Aligns teacher and non-teacher 
retirement age more closely
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Does not address portability issues
Extend average 
salary years
•	Reduces likelihood of salary spikes 
•	Lowers average salaries in benefit 
calculation
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Does not address portability issues 
Change multiplier 
factor
•	Lowers benefit calculation •	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Does not address portability issues 
Restrict sick leave 
days counted
•	Reduces likelihood of teachers 
saving leave time
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Does not address portability issues 
Lengthen vesting 
periods
•	Creates large financial incentives 
for teacher retention
•	Rewards career teachers
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Makes portability issues worse
Political Construct political 
safeguards, such as 
mandating minimum 
annual payments
•	Encourages long-term thinking 
•	Establishes safety net against 
quick decisions
•	Reduces future legislative power 
•	Inflexible during market swings
Structural Adopt defined 
contribution plan
•	More predictable budgeting
•	Solves portability problems 
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	Individuals carry additional risks
Adopt cash balance 
plan
•	More predictable budgeting
•	Solves portability problems 
•	Easy to understand
•	Requires legal changes to affect current or 
retired workers
•	May produce lower investment returns
Table 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Potential Pension Changes 
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states have typically found a breach of contract in 
any reduction in benefits to individual members, 
and they’ve accepted only very minor changes or 
ones that include both additions and subtractions in 
benefits. 
But the hands of state and local policymakers are 
not completely tied to existing legal limitations, 
and there are some measures of reason even in the 
strictest states. All states allow changes to things that 
affect pensions but aren’t actually part of the benefit 
calculation. So even in places with strict constitutional 
protections like New York and Illinois, the state can 
reduce salary levels, terminate employment, or take 
other actions that would reduce an employee’s 
pension, so long as they don’t change the pension 
formula itself. To change the formula for existing 
employees, though, these states would have to 
amend their constitutions. 
In states viewing pensions as a contract between 
employees and their employer, it may be possible 
to convince a court to change the way the contract 
is viewed. One possible argument would be that the 
contract should be viewed as an ongoing contract 
that protects benefits as they are earned, but does 
not protect future accruals that relate to service that 
has not yet been performed. This would protect 
the benefits already earned by workers, but in the 
case of future benefits, the approach would be more 
consistent with that taken in the private sector. 
A handful of states use an approach that rejects 
contracts altogether. It is called the “property interest” 
or “due process of law” approach, and these states 
equate retirement expectations with a property right 
that can only be taken away with due process of 
law. In these states, changes to pension plans are 
allowable so long as they are not arbitrary or irrational. 
These states have been able to raise the retirement 
age, increase early withdrawal penalties, and change 
the definition of compensation as long as the changes 
are pursued out of a state interest and employees are 
given an appropriate warning beforehand. 
Legislators particularly keen on making changes in 
states that protect pensions under a contract theory 
would first need to document a compelling need for 
the change (e.g., a fiscal crisis that makes continuing 
pension accruals at their current rates untenable), 
pass legislation making the desired changes, wait 
for a legal challenge, and then defend the change. 
The process would be similar in a state that protects 
pensions as property interests, but the likelihood of 
surviving a legal challenge would be much higher.
States may be able to augment their case by drafting 
compromise measures that phase in changes 
over time. When lawmakers increased the normal 
retirement age for Social Security from 65 to 67, for 
example, they raised it gradually and over a long time 
horizon. Although the law passed in 1983, the actual 
changes did not take effect until 2000, and even 
then the normal retirement age increased only two 
months at a time. The final effect of the law, moving 
the normal retirement age to 67 for all workers, won’t 
be in place until 2027. These transition periods gave 
workers nearing retirement an advance warning. 
Private-sector employers operating defined benefit 
plans can reduce benefits at any time so long as they 
give their employees 45 days of warning before the 
changes go into effect. States could take an approach 
somewhere between these two examples, and the 
courts may look kindly on a state that takes prudent 
steps to provide opportunities for workers to adapt 
their retirement plans. 
In any case, states with strong legal protections 
can pursue only limited changes, and, for the most 
part, any changes in pension formulas (other than 
benefit enhancements) can affect only prospective 
employees, i.e., unless states change their 
constitutions or are able to convince a court that 
a contractual change is permissible. This makes 
transition costs an important part of any structural 
change. For example, if a state, in a desire to control 
costs, were to switch to a defined contribution plan, 
it could do so only for incoming teachers. While it set 
up the new plan and began enrolling members, the 
state would also have to maintain the current plan 
until the last teacher retired and eventually died. This 
could, alternatively, be seen as a positive. The state 
may have to operate two systems simultaneously, but 
it would not have to transition employees from one 
plan to the other. In the private sector, such transitions 
have been fraught with difficult questions about 
appropriate account balances and with provisions that 
reduce the employee’s pension wealth. Individuals 
have often sued to redress these concerns, and much 
of federal pension law deals with these complex 
transition issues.
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Temporary Technical Fixes 
There are a number of minor financial tweaks that 
states have considered or adopted over the years 
to increase pension revenue or decrease pension 
payments. Some of these options, like restricting the 
number of sick and vacation days used in the benefit 
calculation, for example, should be seen as more 
symbolic than as large-scale financial measures. 
Other options, like raising the retirement age, would 
help to make public-sector retirements a little more 
like those of their private-sector peers, since private-
sector employees are retiring at older ages than their 
public-sector counterparts. Still other options, such 
as lengthening the amount of time before a teacher 
becomes eligible to receive a pension, actually 
work against the human capital issues involved in 
recruiting, retaining, and distributing teacher talent. 
Most importantly, without legal challenges or changes 
to state constitutions, in many states all such changes 
could only affect future teachers. 
These caveats in mind, the easiest fixes, technically, 
are ones that alter the benefit formula. One such 
option is expanding the number of years over which 
an employee’s final average salary is calculated. 
Because salaries tend to rise with experience, 
changing the final average salary from one year’s 
time to three, three to five, or five to 10 will generally 
reduce the benefit the employee can expect to 
receive. Many public-sector pensions are calculated 
off only a few years of wages at the end of the 
worker’s career, which encourages those workers 
to negotiate for steep increases at the end of their 
career. Social Security, as a comparison, uses 35 
years of wages, adjusted for inflation, to calculate 
benefits.
Pairing early retirement incentives with a hiring freeze, 
particularly during recessions, is another way to 
reduce expenditures, at least temporarily. This works 
as a short-term cost-saver because the pension 
payments are smaller than salaries, especially for the 
affected late-career workers who typically command 
higher-than-average salaries. The savings are only 
temporary, however, because once the hiring freeze 
ends, the employer will replace the salary of one 
late-career employee with a pension for the retired 
employee in addition to the salary of the replacement. 
Early retirements essentially shift the costs from 
districts, in the form of salaries, to states, in the form 
of pension payments. And, if the early retirement 
incentives are not allowed to relapse after the 
recession ends, they become the “new normal” that 
workers expect to receive. To address the full extent 
of financial and human capital problems in public-
sector pensions, state and local governments must 
think seriously about more lasting reform. 
Changing the Structure 
Lasting pension reform is most likely to come in the 
form of changes to the way plans are structured. An 
appealing and often-cited idea is to shift to a system 
that looks more like the defined contribution plans 
that private-sector workers have from their employers. 
As a long-term solution, it would solve much of the 
budgeting and underfunding problems states and 
localities currently face. Contributions each year are 
much more predictable. Employers would be able to 
predict their pension contributions each year based 
on salaries and contribution formulas that had been 
previously determined, without worrying about that 
year’s market returns. 
Such a move could also do a great deal to solve 
the human capital and portability issues. School 
districts could use matching contributions and other 
incentives as tools to enhance recruitment and 
retention. And, after a short vesting period, employees 
would own their own accounts and could take them 
with them whether they left their specific position 
Early retirements essentially shift 
the costs from districts, in the 
form of salaries, to states, in the 
form of pension payments. And, 
if the early retirement incentives 
are not allowed to relapse after 
the recession ends, they become 
the “new normal” that workers 
expect to receive.
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or the profession altogether. This would better align 
education benefits with the nature of teaching today—
increased mobility between geography and careers.
Perhaps most importantly, DC plans would not have 
the same perverse push and pull evident in most DB 
plans. Teachers could let circumstances determine 
the right time to change jobs or retire. Retirement 
decisions would no longer be based on pre-
determined formulas or heavily influenced by “benefit 
lock,” the point where it becomes economically 
untenable for educators to leave a job even if they 
wanted to. Instead, such a system would allow 
educators to factor their own interest into decisions to 
continue working, change jobs, or retire. There would 
no longer be specific rewards that accumulate at set 
points in time, pulling teachers to stay to just that 
point and pushing them out after. 
Teachers would also own their own accounts, 
meaning they would be free to invest as much or as 
little as they choose. This would allow teachers dying 
before retirement age or early in their retirement to 
transfer their savings to their heirs directly, instead of 
designating benefits for their survivors. 
For all the promises of DC plans, they do have one 
major weakness: They place the burden of saving 
for retirement on workers. The experience with 401k 
plans in the private sector is mixed. Some workers 
choose not to participate, and by doing so forgo 
free money if their employer is offering matching 
contributions. Individuals also tend to make poor 
choices with the money they do invest. They leave 
it in too-safe investments; they don’t adjust their 
investments for their age (younger workers can afford 
to take more risk, while workers nearing retirement 
should be more conservative); or they park all their 
savings in company stock. When they change jobs, 
they cash out their savings rather than keeping 
it as money for retirement.32 Most fundamentally, 
employees just don’t save enough. A 2007 GAO 
report found that, among workers aged 55-64 with 
a current or former DC plan, the median account 
balance was $50,000, a sum that would convert to an 
annual benefit beginning at age 65 of just $4,400.33 
Part of the problem with DC plans is that they’re 
still too new to evaluate their long-term effect on 
retirement decisions. Companies began transitioning 
from DB to DC plans as their exclusive retirement 
offering in the 1980s and ‘90s, and only now are 
workers who made this transition nearing retirement. 
As these workers begin to retire, we’ll know more 
about long-term effects, but any adverse influences 
on a large and solidly middle-class profession like 
teachers could have ripple effects throughout the 
country. 
An alternative retirement structure to defined benefit 
and defined contribution systems is a cash balance 
plan. Each year, a CB plan awards employees with 
a salary credit (some percentage of their salary) and, 
on the balance already accumulated, an investment 
return credit (some fixed or indexed rate of return). 
The employer’s contributions are set at the fixed 
percentage of salary, and the return credit is fixed 
either at some relatively safe percentage (for instance 
5 percent) or indexed to an external figure like long-
term Treasury notes. Technically, the employer owns 
the plans and has the responsibility (or the benefit) of 
any investment return deficit (or surplus). But when 
workers are ready to retire, they can take their entire 
balance as a lump-sum payment or convert it to an 
annuity that would guarantee them monthly payments 
for life. 
Legally, CB plans are considered DB plans, but 
they have key differences that address many of the 
weaknesses of both DB and DC plans. CB accounts 
are portable and would not disadvantage mobile 
workers or create as many perverse incentives. 
They would not encourage a teacher to retire in any 
particular year. They would be required to cover all 
workers for at least a certain minimum retirement 
savings, but they would not require workers to 
Perhaps most importantly,  
DC plans would not have the 
same perverse push and pull 
evident in most DB plans. 
Teachers could let circumstances 
determine the right time to 
change jobs or retire.
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manage their own investments. And, because CB 
plans are typically invested in low-risk bonds and 
other conservative investments, there would not be 
the same underfunding issues that occur in current 
DB plans. The primary weakness in CB plans is that 
the guaranteed rate of return is typically lower than 
that earned in either DB or DC plans. In essence, 
CB plans trade security and predictability for lower 
returns.
Figure 8 shows what workers could expect from each 
of these three plans. It graphs total pension wealth 
by age and type of pension, with assumptions built in 
around existing plan features. The assumptions are 
taken from 57 large state and local pension systems 
that were specifically selected for their inclusion of 
teachers.34 The figures are in constant 2010 dollars 
and are retrospective for a hypothetical teacher 
beginning her career at age 25 in 1970. They assume 
an annual salary of $50,000 (in reality the teacher 
could expect salary increases with added experience). 
Figure 8 shows what each plan structure would look 
like for teachers staying in the profession for a short 
period of time (10 years) as well as over a 40-year 
career. 
Each plan has distinctive trade-offs.35 For the 
defined benefit plan, the teacher would have only 
her own contributions until vesting with five years 
of experience. Figure 8 shows that if she left the 
profession with fewer than 10 years of experience, 
she would lose out with a DB plan. Figure 8 also 
shows that a teacher with a DB plan would see her 
pension rise to a peak after 30 years of experience, 
(the median service requirement for normal retirement 
in the 57 plans). She is 55 years old. At this point, 
assuming a life expectancy of 78 years, her pension 
would be worth $660,000. She does not own this 
money, but is guaranteed annual payments totaling 
$30,000, plus annual cost-of-living adjustments. For 
simplicity’s sake, this hypothetical assumes she takes 
her maximum monthly benefit and does not leave 
any benefits for her survivors.36 If she lives long into 
retirement, she will continue to receive her guaranteed 
Note: Authors’ calculations: All three use a $50,000 base salary and the observed U.S. inflation rate from 1970 to 2010. CB plan assumes an investment return credit based on the 10-year 
Treasury bond rate from 1970 to 2010, 5.68 percent employee contribution in all years, and 7.49 percent employer contribution rate phased in over the employee’s first three years. DC plan uses 
last 40 years of annual market returns on the S&P 500 (March 2, 1970 to March 1, 2010), 5.68 percent employee contribution in all years, and 7.49 percent employer contribution rate phased in 
over three years. Workers could choose to invest in more conservative assets (or a mix of aggressive and conservative), but this chart assumes they invest all of their retirement savings in a 
mutual fund tracking the S&P 500. DB plan assumes a five-year vesting requirement (if they leave before vesting, they get only their own contributions back, compounded at 5 percent interest, 
minus inflation), a 2 percent multiplier, normal retirement age of 62, and 30-year service requirement for early retirement. The contribution assumptions for all three plans and the age and vesting 
requirements in the DB plan are the median values used by 57 state and district pension plans that include teachers. 
It’s important to note that while the defined contribution and the cash balance plans represent fiscally neutral options, i.e., they would cost teachers and taxpayers the same amount as they do 
now, the defined benefit plan relies on current assumptions about investment returns and employee and employer contributions that may not accurately reflect the true long-term cost to 
taxpayers. For instance, if the stock market under-performs state estimates, taxpayers would have to make up the difference between the estimates and the actual rate of return, which could be 
substantial. 
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figure for the remainder of her life. Keep in mind, the 
defined benefit plan exhibits a true peak after this 
teacher has worked 30 years. If she works fewer 
years, she can expect a smaller benefit. If she works 
more years, her pension wealth diminishes, because 
every year she continues working is a year she cannot 
receive pension benefits. 
Compare these results to the defined contribution 
plan. Each year, the employee and employer combine 
to set aside 13.17 percent of the employee’s salary 
after a three-year phase-in period of the employer 
contributions (the median figure of the 57 large DB 
plans). The money is invested directly in a mutual fund 
tracking the Dow Jones Industrial Average (the graph 
uses the annual returns from March 2, 1970, to March 
1, 2010). As the market rises and falls, so does the 
worker’s retirement savings account, at times to great 
effect. For a teacher beginning her career in 1970 at 
the age of 25, her DC account balance would have 
peaked in 2000, at the end of the Internet boom, at 
$719,000. At the age of 65, after a tumultuous decade 
for the stock market, the value would be down to 
$494,000. A teacher with this type of benefit plan 
would need to retire when the market is at a peak in 
order to maximize her retirement savings. And since 
DC accounts are owned by workers, if they die early 
in retirement, the balance of the account, after taxes, 
can be passed on to their heirs. Alternatively, if they 
live long into retirement, they bear the burden of 
making their finances last. 
In contrast to each of these two traditional plans is 
the cash balance plan. After a three-year phase-in 
period for employer contributions, employees receive 
a 13.17 percent salary credit, including their own 
contribution of 5.68 percent, and an investment return 
credit equal to the rate of return on 10-year Treasury 
notes. These figures are guaranteed for the duration 
of the employee’s tenure. A teacher beginning her 
career in 1970 with a CB plan would have seen her 
retirement account rise steadily over her career and 
reach $459,000 when she turned 65. The downside of 
the CB plan, however, is obvious: With a real rate of 
return of only 2.75 percent, after 4.5 percent inflation 
over the last 40 years, it is the least aggressive and 
lowest-performing, albeit steadiest, option. 
Question DB plan DC plan CB plan
Who bears the risk of investment 
returns? 
Plan Sponsor Employee Plan Sponsor
Who is responsible for making sure 
contributions are sufficient? 
Plan Sponsor Employee Employee/ Plan Sponsor
Who bears the risk of the employee living 
longer than expected? 
Plan Sponsor Employee* Employee*
Who bears the risk of inflation devaluing 
the benefits? 
Plan Sponsor Employee Employee
Are employer contributions predictable? No Yes Yes
Who bears the risk of the employee 
becoming disabled?
Plan Sponsor Employee Plan Sponsor
Are employees automatically enrolled? Yes No Yes
Are accounts portable across 
employers? 
No** Yes Yes
Are account balances transferrable to 
unmarried survivors? 
No Yes Yes
*Employees could choose to purchase annuities with their savings at the time of retirement, which would provide regular payments until 
death. 
**Although states and districts vary, most impose severe penalties on workers who exit the system before retirement.
Table 2. Frequently Asked Questions About Different Pension Structures
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Any changes will create winners 
and losers, but this ignores 
the extent to which the current 
system creates winners and 
losers already.
Guideposts for Pension Reform
There is no easy way out of today’s pension problems. 
All the options to fix the problems are substantially 
challenging, politically difficult, or both. Yet each 
year of inaction is a year the problem gets worse.  
Following are six guideposts for policymakers as they 
work to modernize today’s pension systems.
1. Acknowledge that there is a problem. The first 
step to addressing this problem is to acknowledge 
that it exists. Elected leaders and policymakers as 
well as teachers unions and teachers associations 
all have incentives to play down the extent of this 
problem. Some elected officials do not want to be 
accountable for bad decisions made in the past. 
Teachers unions and teachers associations realize 
that reform may change some of the vested privileges 
and power that they enjoy under the current system. 
And, their most active members are generally winners 
under the current system. All stakeholders, especially 
the future beneficiaries of public retirement systems, 
deserve an honest accounting of the scale of this 
problem. 
 
2. Craft policy solutions with an eye toward public 
finance realities and education’s human capital 
problem. There are technical fixes and structural 
changes that policymakers could take to ease 
problems today and in the future. But solutions to 
the fiscal side of the equation that do not also take 
into account the education policy issues will further 
entrench today’s human capital problems. Education 
policy experts and public finance, pension, and 
income security experts should all be at the table 
when policymakers are crafting solutions.
3. Think about the profession differently. Today’s 
pension schemes are built around a profession 
that practitioners remain in for 20-30 years with an 
expectation that performance and value continue to 
improve over time. But gains in teacher effectiveness 
are heavily concentrated in the early years.37 And 
younger workers, including teachers, are much more 
likely to move between careers. Solutions to the 
pension problem should be designed with an eye 
toward how the profession will look in the future, not 
how it looked in the past.
In particular, rather than back-loading benefits, 
policymakers should consider ways to smooth the 
accumulation of benefits or even front-load them to 
help attract people to the profession. Major points 
of benefit accumulation could also be linked to key 
points in an educator’s career. For instance, the 
point at which a teacher earns tenure could be a 
higher and more demanding bar than it is today and 
include an accompanying financial recognition for 
the accomplishment. Some of the resources that 
are currently used to back-load benefits could be 
repurposed as recruitment and retention tools for 
educators in the future.
Any changes will create winners and losers, but this 
ignores the extent to which the current system creates 
winners and losers already, especially teachers who 
do not teach for an entire career or who move even 
once during their careers.
4. Hold harmless the benefits of current retirees 
and the benefits accrued to date of current 
teachers. Not only is honoring public commitments 
the right thing to do (and legally required in many 
cases), it’s the politically smart thing as well. 
Teachers unions and teachers associations are 
disproportionately driven by the wishes of their older 
members. Thus, as much as possible, policymakers 
should seek to make these educators allies in reform 
rather than opponents. But ensuring that current 
educators are as minimally affected as possible 
should not preclude flexible and creative solutions to 
modernize the system. 
To help ease any transition, states and districts 
pursuing reforms should consider transition periods, 
allowing any changes to take effect slowly and give 
workers the option to plan accordingly. The federal 
government requires private-sector employers to give 
45 days warning to workers when cutting retirement 
contributions; states should consider longer transition 
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periods of one to three years. In addition, reforms 
and fixes need not mean abandoning the goal of 
ensuring that educators have comfortable, dignified 
retirements. There are strategies that can both 
guarantee a more sustainable retirement system 
but also help educators save and plan for their own 
retirements. 
5. Seek changes that would make laws concerning 
pension system modifications more feasible. 
States and districts can change salary levels or fringe 
benefits and can terminate employees pursuant to 
collective bargaining agreements—all things that 
affect pension calculations. But in many places they 
are legally forbidden from altering the prospective 
retirement benefits to employees who have been 
working for as little as one day. States can pursue 
legal efforts that would allow for greater flexibility. The 
federal government, for example, protects all pensions 
earned, but does not protect theoretical obligations. 
6. Pursue political reforms. Enhancements to 
government pension plans are often political carrots 
that legislators can offer to important constituents, 
but such decisions are often made without full 
consideration of their long-term fiscal impacts. States 
should follow the lead of Oklahoma and Georgia, 
which have recognized this pressure and enacted 
political reforms that will slow down and improve their 
decision-making process. 
7. Increase transparency and analytic ability. States 
should incorporate pension data into state education 
data systems by linking pension information with 
personnel records and student achievement data to 
allow for richer analysis. States currently keep data 
about teacher retirement systems separate from 
other sources of information. But it would ensure 
greater transparency and provide additional sources 
of information if teacher retirement information 
was paired with data about student achievement, 
administrative records, and other sources of 
information that are commonly stored in state 
longitudinal databases. As with all data, the privacy of 
teachers and students must be respected, but such 
data are essential to a better understanding of trends 
and challenges in a state’s education work force.
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State
Unfunded Liability* 
($)
Funded Ratio*
(%) Population
Unfunded Liability 
Per Capita ($)**
Alabama 9,228,918,000 77 4,661,900 1,980
Alaska 3,522,661,000 76 686,293 5,133
Arizona 7,871,120,000 80 6,500,180 1,211
Arkansas 2,752,546,000 87 2,855,390 964
California 59,492,498,000 87 36,756,666 1,619
Colorado 16,813,048,000 70 4,939,456 3,404
Connecticut 15,858,500,000 62 3,501,252 4,529
Delaware 129,359,000 98 873,092 148
Florida –1,798,789,000 101 18,328,340 –98
Georgia 6,384,903,000 92 9,685,744 659
Hawaii 5,168,108,000 69 1,288,198 4,012
Idaho 772,200,000 93 1,523,816 507
Illinois 54,383,939,000 54 12,901,563 4,215
Indiana 9,825,830,000 72 6,376,792 1,541
Iowa 2,694,794,000 89 3,002,555 898
Kansas 8,279,168,000 59 2,802,134 2,955
Kentucky 12,328,429,000 64 4,269,245 2,888
Louisiana 11,658,734,000 70 4,410,796 2,643
Maine 2,782,173,000 80 1,316,456 2,113
Maryland 10,926,099,000 78 5,633,597 1,939
Massachusetts 21,759,452,000 63 6,497,967 3,349
Michigan 11,541,600,000 84 10,003,422 1,154
Minnesota 10,771,507,000 81 5,220,393 2,063
Mississippi 7,971,277,000 73 2,938,618 2,713
Missouri 9,025,293,000 83 5,911,605 1,527
Montana 1,549,503,000 84 967,440 1,602
Nebraska 754,748,000 92 1,783,432 423
Nevada 7,281,752,000 76 2,600,167 2,800
New Hampshire 2,522,175,000 68 1,315,809 1,917
New Jersey 34,434,055,000 73 8,682,661 3,966
New Mexico 4,519,887,000 83 1,984,356 2,278
New York –10,428,000,000 107 19,490,297 –535
North Carolina 504,760,000 99 9,222,414 55
North Dakota 546,500,000 87 641,481 852
Ohio 19,502,065,000 87 11,485,910 1,698
Oklahoma 13,172,407,000 61 3,642,361 3,616
Oregon 10,739,000,000 80 3,790,060 2,833
Pennsylvania 13,724,480,000 87 12,448,279 1,103
Appendix: Per Person State Pension Plan Liabilities
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State
Unfunded Liability* 
($)
Funded Ratio*
(%) Population
Unfunded Liability 
Per Capita ($)**
Rhode Island 4,353,892,000 61 1,050,788 4,143
South Carolina 12,052,684,000 70 4,479,800 2,690
South Dakota 182,870,000 97 804,194 227
Tennessee 1,602,802,000 95 6,214,888 258
Texas 13,781,228,000 91 24,326,974 566
Utah 3,611,399,000 84 2,736,424 1,320
Vermont 461,551,000 88 621,270 743
Virginia 10,723,000,000 84 7,769,089 1,380
Washington –179,100,000 100 6,549,224 –27
West Virginia 4,968,709,000 64 1,814,468 2,738
Wisconsin 252,600,000 100 5,627,967 45
Wyoming 1,444,353,000 79 532,668 2,712
Total 452,222,687,000 302,935,223 1,489
*From “The Trillion Dollar Gap: Underfunded State Retirement Systems and the Roads to Reform” Pew Center on the States, February 2010 (2008 figures).
** Authors’ calculations from “The Trillion Dollar Gap.”
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